Tax evasion, by its very nature, is difficult to observe. We quantify the effects of tax rates on tax evasion, by examining the relationship in China between the tariff schedule and the 'evasion gap' which we define as the difference between Hong Kong's reported exports to China at the product level and China's reported imports from Hong Kong. Our results imply that a one percentage point increase in the tax rate is associated with a 3 percent increase in evasion. Furthermore, the evasion gap is negatively correlated with tax rates on closely related products, suggesting that evasion takes place partly through mis -classification of imports from higher-taxed categories to lower-taxed ones, in addition to under-reporting the value of imports. JEL Classification: H2, F1
Introduction
This paper studies the responsiveness of tax evasion to tax rates. Much of the work in the theory and empirics of taxation has taken tax collection as given and often costlessly executed. This simplification is unlikely to be realistic: even within the United States, where tax collection is considered to be relatively efficient, about 17 percent of income taxes are estimated as unpaid (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2000) . One particularly important issue is understanding the relationship between tax rates and tax evasion. A number of models have evolved to incorporate tax evasion, but these models fail to provide any prediction rega rding the uniform impact of tax rates on evasion. In the pioneering work of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) , the relationship between tax rates and evasion is positive, but this depends on particular assumptions of risk aversion and the punishment for evasion. A broader review of the literature reports that, more generally, theoretical predictions of the effect of tax rates on evasion are highly sensitive to modeling assumptions (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2000) . 1 Furthermore, even if the effect of tax rates on evasion may be signed, there is still a need to assess the magnitude of this effect. Hence, empirically examining the effect of tax rates on evasion would be very useful from the perspectives of both theory and policy. This has proven to be a challenging task due to the difficulties in measuring evasion, which by definition is not directly observed.
A number of indirect approaches have been used to infer the behavior of tax evasion from measurable quantities such as currency demand or the discrepancies between national income and product accounts (e.g., Gutmann, 1977 , Feige, 1979 , Tanzi, 1980 . These approaches have been criticized by Slemrod and Yitzhaki in their survey paper on the subject, since "[n]one of these approaches is likely to be reliable…as the ir accuracy depends either on unverifiable assumptions or on how well the demand for currency is estimated" (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2000) . Furthermore, these approaches do not naturally generate an estimate of the responsiveness of evasion to tax rates.
As a more direct approach to examining tax evasion, researchers have used data from the U.S. Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) conducted by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service. Based on intensive audits of a random sample of tax returns, the data set gives information on reported taxable income and what auditors later conclude to be true taxable income. Using these data, Clotfelter (1983) estimated that tax evasion is positively associated with tax rates, with the elasticity ranging from 0.5 to 3. Feinstein (1991) , using a short panel of two years of TCMP data (1982 and 1985) , found that increasing the marginal tax rate has a negative effect on evasion, contradicting
Clotfelter's conclusion. However, the main source of variation on tax rates in both of these studies comes from differential marginal tax rates across income levels, so it is not really possible to disentangle tax rate effects from income effects.
In this paper, we take a new approach in measuring the effect of tax rates on evasion that is less likely to be contaminated by such problems. Specifically, we examine evasion in China's imports from Hong Kong, at a very disaggregated level (e.g., fourdoor passenger car), by comparing Hong Kong's reported exports and China's reported imports of the same products. In the absence of evasion (and measurement error), China and Hong Kong-reported numbers should be the same. So far, the extent to which they differ has generally been taken to be measurement errors (see, for example, Feenstra and Hanson, 2000) . However, when we match these data up with product-specific tax rates in China (tariff plus value-added tax rates), we find that this 'evasion gap' is highly correlated with Chinese tax rates: much more value is 'lost' for products with higher tax rates. Our methodology is related to that of Pritchett and Sethi (1994) , who find that tax revenues divided by imports increase at a rate less than the official tax rate, in a sample of four developing countries. Note, however, that our analysis is at a much higher level of disaggregation; furthermore, they are unable to disentangle illegal tax evasion from legal tax avoidance (e.g., taking advantage of tax loopholes and special exemption). Tax avoidance, as it is legal, is more readily observed than evasion.
Another novel feature of our study is that we are able to differentiate three different aspects of tax evasion: under-reporting of unit value, under-reporting of taxable evasion is dependent on the value of taxes evaded (as is the case in China), tax rate increases will reduce evasion.
quantities, and the mislabeling of higher-taxed products as lower-taxed products. We find strong evidence of mislabeling and limited evidence of under-reporting of unit value;
on the other hand, once shifting reported imports from a higher-to a lower-taxed category is controlled for, we do not find evidence of under-reporting of overall imported quantities. In looking at the effects of changes in tax rates between 1997 and 1998 on changes in evasion, we obtain similar results. Finally, when we use a flexible functional form, we find that tax evasion occurs mostly at higher tax rates. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data on taxes and imports/exports. Section 3 provides the details of our empirical specification and the results. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
Data
The trade flow data in this paper are taken from the World Bank's World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database, which in turn is derived from the United Nations' Comtrade database. These data are collected by the United Nations Statistical
Division from individual countries' trade records, and include information on imports and exports for each country, recorded according to the 6-digit Harmonized Commodity
Description and Coding System (HS). The United Nations allows individual countries to have a classification sys tem more detailed than the HS 6 digit levels. In the case of China, an 8-digit classification (a refined version of the HS 6-digit classification) is available. However, we choose to use the import data at the 6-digit level in order to be compatible with Hong Kong-reported numbers. The current HS classification system began in 1996, which is also the earliest year for which we have year-end data on tax rates. Kong customs authorities may understand this as an indirect export to China, China might misclassify at least a portion of such transactions as being direct imports from 2 These were almost exclusively missing observations on both imports and exports; where observations were available for imports and not for exports, it is almost certainly the result of misclassified re-exports (see below). When all regressions were repeated, using all observations on exports and redefining Gap_Value = log(1+Export_Value) -log(1+Import_Value), the sample size increased by about 2 percent, and our results were virtually identical to those reported in Section 3 below. We define the direct export ratio to be:
We drop from the sample all products where the Direct Export Ratio is below 0.01, which eliminates approximately 18 percent of the sample. Generally, the Direct Export Ratio takes on relatively low values, as illustrated in Figure 1 , which gives the frequency distribution of this variable. As this is a cause of some concern, we will consider various cut-off values, ranging from 0.00 to 0.10, in the robustness tests below.
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Our standard cutoff of 0.01 leaves a final sample size of 1663 products; some regressions involve fewer observations due to missing observations on other regressors (details provided in Section 3). The distribution of the direct export ratio for our final sample is shown in Figure 1 .
Comtrade contains data on both the value and quantity of imports/exports; we will utilize both sets of data. In the case of quantities, we are also required to know the units of measurement (e.g., weight, number; area); in most cases, these values match up between the Chinese (import) and Hong Kong (export) data. Where they do not, it is 4 We thank Professor SUNG Yung-Wing at the Chinese University in Hong Kong for a helpful discussion on this issue. 5 The low rate of direct exports is certainly a cause for concern. However, there is considerable evidence in the sample statistics that the import numbers are more closely tied to direct, rather than indirect, exports.
As some indication of this, the overall level of reported imports in our sample is 4,616,684, which is within twenty percent of the total reported level of direct exports (5,344,158). By contrast, the level of indirect exports differs by a factor of five (29, 243, 699 Our basic definition of the evasion gap is given by 6 :
Thus defined, a larger gap is an indication of greater evasion. We similarly define the gap in quantities reported as:
The data on Chinese tariffs and taxes were also taken from WITS, derived from the UNCTAD TRAINS (Trade Analysis and Information System) database, which gives tariff rates at the 8-digit HS level. Since our import/export data are at the 6-digit level,
we need some way of aggregating up the tariff rates to the 6-digit level. Since there is relatively little variation in tax rates at the 8-digit level within a 6-digit category, so we are able to restrict ourselves to the sample for which there are uniform rates at this level of aggregation. In addition to tariffs, there is a value-added tax levied on most imports, which varies from 13 to 17 percent. Our measure of taxation, Tax 1998 , is the sum of tariff and VAT tax. Using logs creates problems with those observations where imports are zero; where exports are zero, and imports are non-zero, this is clearly a reporting error resulting most often from mistaken recording of reexports. To get around this problem, we also ran our analyses using (Exports -Imports)/(Export + Import) as the dependent variable. This generated coefficients that were of similar statistical significance and magnitude as those reported in the body of the text. 7 We argue that the sum of tariffs and the VAT is the most appropriate measure: if an importer already under-reports the value of a particular product, she would also evade the associated VAT. If a car is smuggled into the country without paying the tariff, it is likely to be sold on the black market without paying the VAT. However, as a robustness check, we have also replicated the key regressions restricting the tax variable to include only the tariff rate at customs, but not the VAT. The results are virtually identical to those reported in the main text.
The earliest year for which we have detailed data on tariffs is 1996, and our data reflect year-end tariff rates. Unfortunately, for most years since 1996, there were changes in the tariff rates in the middle of the year. Since the import and export data are cumulated for the entire year, ma tching imports with the appropriate tax rates is challenging. However, in 1998, a single tariff schedule was used throughout the year.
Therefore, in our benchmark regressions, we report results utilizing data from 1998, which also happens to be the most recent year for which data were available on both imports and exports. As an extension, we also implement regressions using two years of data (1997 and 1998). We will explain the construction of the 1997 tax rate later in the paper.
Figures 2(I) and 2(II) illustrate the extent and sources of variation in tariff rate. In Figure 2 (I), we give the frequency distribution of tariff rates for all products used in our
analyses. As this figure shows, there is considerable variation in tariff rates, in general.
While much of this variation occurs across 4-digit categories, there remains substantial within 4-digit variation, as illustrated by Figure 2 (II), which shows the difference between the maximum and minimum for each 4-digit category, conditional on this value exceeding zero. For these 936 observations, there is a high frequency of observations at values up to 10. There is thus scope to properly identify the effect of within-category variation with these data.
Part of evasion is thought to take place by mislabeling imported products from a higher-taxed to a lower-taxed type, which is easier for "similar" products.
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Operationally, two products are considered "similar" if they are in the same 4-digit category. We define Avg(Tax_o) to be the average level of Tax for all other products in a good's 4-digit class, weighted by Export_Value. 9 There are several reasons to use this level of aggregation for examining misclassification. Using a finer division produces almost no variation, so misclassification across 5-digit categories would not provide any 8 To draw on an example in the context of a more developed economy, the U.S. steel industry provides an interesting case study. There is considerable dispersion of tariff rates within many relatively narrow classes of steel products, and importers in recent years have been caught mislabeling closely related products (e.g., low grade wire as high grade wire; reinforced steel rods as flat rolled steel; see Matthews, 2001 benefit to importers. A 3-digit aggregation is overly coarse (see furniture example in the following paragraph).
The phenomenon of misclassification may be illustrated by the anecdotal example of furniture imports, which was reportedly a problem for customs authorities in China in the mid-1990s (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2000) . Furniture are in a 3-digit category (940), which covers a highly heterogeneous range of products (mattresses vs. chairs; wooden vs. metal). At this level, clear differences across products exist, making mislabeling difficult. However, at the 4-digit level, products have a higher degree of similarity (e.g., 9401 -seats versus seat parts), and there is still a considerable variation in tariff rates within each 4-digit category: In 1996, the average difference between the minimum and maximum tax rates within 4-digit furniture categories was 20 percentage points. In that year, the average evasion gap was 64 percent higher for products with the maximum tax rates than those with the minimum tax rates. In 1997, when the Chinese government brought in uniform furniture tax rates, the evasion gaps became more similar across different types of furniture, with the difference between the maximum and minimum gaps narrowing to approximately 3 percent.
There are a number of categories of similar products that maintained their dispersion through to 1998, the year which is used for the bulk of our analyses. As one example, we list in Table 1 the tariff rates for machine tools (category 8459), where we see that the tariff rate depends mainly on whether the machinery is numerically controlled.
For a full list of variables, definitions, and sources, see the Appendix.
Summary statistics for our variables are contained in Table 2 (I). One point to note is that the evasion gap has a negative mean. This appears to be due to Chinese customs misattributing some portion of indirect imports as direct imports, as discussed above. This is suggested by the fact that when we exclude observations for which the Direct Export Ratio is below the median, the evasion gap rises above zero (see Table   2 (II)). Also note that the evasion gap is higher when measured in values rather than quantities; this is suggestive that some evasion takes the form of under-reporting of per unit values.
By examining some basic cross-tabulations in the data, we may informally get a sense of the extent of evasion through product misclassification and/or under-reporting.
In Table 3 (I), we consider the evasion gap for goods in higher-taxed 4-digit categories (i.e., those with tax rates above median at the 4-digit level) as compared to those in lower taxed categories (i.e., those with tax rates below the median). The median evasion gap is about 40% higher for the higher taxed products, suggesting that an increase in the tax rate is associated with a rise in evasion. In Table 3 (II), we perform a different tabulation, comparing the evasion gaps at the minimum and maximum tax rates within each 4-digit classification. Column (1) shows that for the full sample, the evasion gap is marginally higher (by about 8%) for goods that have the highest tax rate within their respective 4-digit classes, relative to the gap for the lowest taxed goods within the same 4-digit category. The full sample includes, however, many products with very little dispersion within their 4-digit categories, and hence little difference between minimum and maximum tax rates. In Column (2), we limit the sample to those 4-digit categories for which the spread between the maximum and minimum tax rates at a 6-digit level within the 4-digit category exceeds 5 percentage points (the median spread). This subsample yields a much larger difference between the evasion gaps of the minima and maxima, of 0.40.
In Table 4 , we cut the sample in the two dimensions previously described simultaneously: between minimum vs. maximum tax rates within 4-digit categories and between high vs. low tax rates across 4-digit categories. We focus on those 4-digit categories for which the difference between the maximum and minimum tax rates at the 6-digit level in the same 4-digit category exceeds 5 percentage points. The evasion gap is larger for higher taxed products. This is true when we look across industries at the 4 digit level (Column 3 in Table 4 ); it is also true within 4 digit industries when we compare the gaps of minima and maxima at the 6-digit level within a common 4-digit categories (Row C in Table 4 ). This suggests that the patterns in Tables 3(I) and 3(II) are both separately present in the data; to further confirm this, we proceed to regression analyses.
Empirical Analysis Benchmark specification
We begin by defining the following: Export k = Hong Kong reported direct exports of good k to China (which we take as the true import of good k by China from Hong Kong). Import k = Direct imports of good k by China from Hong Kong as reported to Chinese Customs.
The prediction that we will be examining in the empirical test is that the difference between reported exports and imports is increasing in the tax rate, due to evasion. That is:
( 1) (2) Import* k = Import k + Misclassified Indirect Import k .
It is crucial to note that the same tax rate is applicable to both direct and indirect imports. Therefore, the magnitude of the misclassified indirect imports for a particular product should be uncorrelated with the tax rate for that product, since there is no tax advantage from misclassification. Rather, it is plausibly proportional to the magnitude of the import of that product (subject to some random error). We will assume that
Where θ is a constant, and η k is an independent and identically distributed random variable, with distributional assumptions to be made later. Thus,
Combining these four equations, we obtain (5) log(Export k ) -log(Import* k )= a* + ß Tax k + e k or equivalently:
where α* is a (new) constant, and e k a composite error term that is assumed to be iid and normal with a mean of zero and a constant variance. To be more precise, if we denote the mean of e k -log(1+ θ η k ) by α 0 , then,
Equation (5) will be the benchmark for our regression specifications. The results are reported in Table 5 . In the first column, we have the basic estimate of the sensitivity of evasion to tax rates, which is 2.93. This implies that if the tax rate increases by one percentage point, the gap between reported exports and imports increases by about three percent. When observations with the highest and lowest one percent of values of
Gap_Value are excluded, the coefficient is virtually unchanged, as seen in the second column. In order to make direct comparisons with other results to be reported later in this paper, we also repeat this basic specification using the sub-sample of products with nonmissing observations on taxes on similar products, and also limiting the sample to products with non-missing observations on quantities. These sub-samples may also be viewed as a sensitivity check for the main results. Columns 3 to 7 in Table 5 show that changing the sample in these ways has very little impact on the reported coefficient: One cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient is 3 in all the cases in this Table. Unfortunately, because of noise (possibly introduced by misclassified indirect imports), the fit of the regressions might be considered to be poor. A common method of dealing with noisy data is aggregation. We follow this approach, using as the outcome variable the mean value of Gap_Value for each tax rate. There are 42 distinct tax rates, thereby yielding a total of 42 observations. The basic relationship between the mean value of Gap_Value and tax rates is illustrated in Figure 3 , and is suggestive of a positive correlation. The regression results weighted by number of observations per tax bracket, as well as the unweighted regression, are listed in Table 6 , columns 1 and 2. The coefficients on Tax, 2.90 and 2.41, respectively, are similar to the baseline regressions from Table 5 , significantly different from zero at the one percent level, but insignificantly different from 3. 10 The R 2 in the two regressions increase to 0.23 and 0.28, respectively.
Taking means as in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 is a linear operation, which allows for the same interpretation of the slope coefficients as in Table 5 . As an alternative way to reduce the noise in the data, we also use the median of the evasion gap, So far, we have concentrated our discussion on the statistical properties of the estimation. It is also useful to consider the economic implications of the point estimate in terms of revenue collection. From (1), we can infer how reported imports may be affected by an increase in the tax rate:
10 The observations at the far right of Figure 3 involving high tax rates could be outliers. When these three observations are removed from the sample, the unweighted regression yields a coefficient of 1.9, significant at the 5 percent level; the results for the weighted regression are virtually the same as those reported in Table 6 .
(8) (dImports/dTax) = (dExports/dTax) -ß Imports Exports
Hence, the effect of a tax increase may reduce reported imports through two channels: by reducing the true imports (i.e., Hong Kong's exports, the first term in (8)); and by reducing the fraction of true imports that is reported to Chinese Customs (-ß, the second term in equation (8)). While we do not have a direct estimate of the first term in Equation (8), it is reasonable to assume that it is negative. Therefore, an estimate of β equal to 3 percent implies that, for any product whose tax rate exceeds 33.3 percent, a one-percentage point increase in the tax rate would lead to a more than one-percentage point reduction in reported imports. The average tax rate on imports (tariff plus VAT) in
China is 36 percent (see Table 2 ). These calculations suggest that the average tax rate is already on the wrong side of the Laffer curve: at the average rate, an increase in the tax rate will produce a reduction in tax revenue.
On a related point, we observe that we have assumed that tax rates are exogenous ly set by the government. However, if the government tries to protect tax revenue by setting tax rates systematically in inverse proportion to importers' ability to evade them, then the estimated responsiveness of tax evasion to tax rate reported here may underestimate the true degree of responsiveness.
Evasion by misclassification
In addition to underreporting the value of imports, evasion may take the form of misclassification -reporting a higher-taxed product as a lower-taxed variety. To investigate the existence of this type of evasion, we add the average tax rate of similar goods as a regressor. For a particular good k, its "similar products" are defined as all other products in the same 4-digit category. Define Avg(Tax_o) to be the average tax rate for product k's similar products, weighted by the value of their Hong Kong-reported exports. We implement a regression of the fo llowing form:
If the mislabeling of goods is prevalent, we expect ß 2 < 0, so that holding a product's own tax rate constant, the lower the tax rate on product k's similar varieties, the greater the incentive to misreport the import of k as other similar products. We have also emplo yed specifications that replace the average tax rate with the minimum tax rate among all "similar" products. A possible rationale is that the taxevader may want to mislabel the import as the lowest-taxed "similar" product rather than any "similar" produc t. Empirically, this change in regressor has very little impact on the estimated coefficients. When both the minimum and average tariff rates are included in the regressions, the coefficient on the minimum tariff rate loses its significance, while the coefficient on average tariff rates is relatively unaffected (results not reported to save space).
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Quantity versus unit value
Thus far, we have not separated the under-reporting of unit values versus the under-reporting of quantities; both will result in a positive coefficient on Tax in the value regressions. We now turn to regressions that use the gap in imported quantity as the dependent variable. Specifically, we examine the following regressions:
11 Note that the difference in the magnitude of the coefficients on Tax and Avg(Tax_o) further suggests the presence of both mislabeling and underpricing. As an extension, we tried to examine the extent that underpricing increases as the potential for mislabeling declines. To implement this, we added the interaction of tariff rate levels with the standard deviation within 4-digit categories; this approach did not yield any statistically significant results. 12 A further check on our mislabeling interpretation comes from the observation that, if a product is a relatively small fraction of total imports in a 4-digit class, we may expect a larger proportional effect from mislabeling. Define Proportion to be the ratio of the import of a particular product to total imports in that good's 4-digit class. Then (Tax Rate)*(Proportion) should take a negative coefficient, while the coefficient on (Taxes on Similar Products)*Proportion should be positive. We do find this to be the case (interaction terms significant at the 5 percent level). Results available from the authors. If the under-reporting of quantities is prevalent, we expect to find a positive coefficient on Tax k in the quantity regression, ß 1 > 0. If there is mislabeling of imports from a higher-taxed category to a lower-taxed one, we expect to find ß 2 < 0.
Results parallel to those of Table 5 and 7 using Gap_Qty as the dependent variable, are listed in Table 8 . When Avg(Tax_o) is excluded from the regression, the coefficient on Tax is insignificantly different from zero. However, when Avg(Tax_o) is included, we find that the coefficient on Tax becomes significant, positive, and approximately equal to the coefficient on Avg(Tax_o) in absolute value. Thus, the data suggest that under-reporting of the total value of imports and mislabeling the type of goods are prevalent, while under-reporting of total quantities imported across all tax brackets is not significant.
Tariff exemptions
Many of Hong Kong's imports into China are exempt from import tariffs. These exemptions may impact incentives for evasion, and could be correlated with tariff rates, since high tax rates may increase incentives for exemption seeking. 13 More precisely, for products where exemptions are common, evasion may be less sensitive to tax rates than for products where exemptions are rare, since exemptions provide a legal means of avoiding tax payments.
We now examine whether taking into account exemptions has any material effect our main result. To do this, we first describe the calculation of the fraction of imports that is exempt from taxation for each of the 6-digit products. We obtained data at the 8- where Exempt is an indicator variable denoting whether a product is exempt from import tariffs, HS6 denotes products at the 6-digit level of aggregation, and HS8 denotes products at the 8-digit level of aggregation. Aggregating in this way is necessary in order to match to the Hong Kong-reported export data (which is at the 6-digit level). Table 9 shows the results of the following specification, and its variations: Consistent with higher exemption rates lowering the incentives for evasion, the coefficient on Exemption is consistently negative and significant (See columns (1) to (4)).
When interacted with Tax, the coefficient is negative, highly significant, and approximately the same size as the coefficient on Tax. This implies that for a product with complete exemption in 1998 (i.e., Exemption=1), there is no effect on evasion from tax increases. By contrast, for industries with no exemptions, the implied elasticity is about 16.
14 In looking at the effect of exemptions on incentives to re-label goods, we find that the coefficient on Avg(Tax_o)*Exemption is positive, though not significant at conventional levels (t-statistic of 1.5), implying less re-labeling for goods with high exemption levels. In columns (5) to (8), we report the results of the same regressions, using Gap_Qty as the outcome variable, and obtain similar results.
First differences in tax rates
Our primary results suggest a strong effect of taxes on evasion acting through both under-pricing and product mislabeling to lower-taxed categories. There may be concerns, however, that certain features of different products that are not directly measured and not included in the regressions may be driving the results. While we do not have specific factors in mind that may bias our result, as a further robustness check, use two years of data and adopt a first-difference specification that can net out timeinvariant and product-specific determinants of tax evasion. We estimate the following:
where a prefix D-denotes the change between 1997 and 1998.
Since China underwent significant tariff reforms in 1997, largely driven by its goal of entry into the WTO, there is substantial variation in tariff rates across the two years. For the industries in our sample, tax rates dropped by an average of 5.6 percentage points. The dispersion in tariff rates within each 4-digit category also declined: the standard deviation of tariff rates within each 4-digit classification declined from an average of 1.9 to an average of 1.4. These simultaneous changes in both tariff rates and within-4-digit dispersion allows for the identification of the effects of changes in both
Tax and Avg(Tax_o).
Determining the appropriate tax rate for 1997 is not straightforward. While there was virtually no change in the tariff structure during 1998, a large-scale tariff reform occurred on October 1, 1997. Since our import data for 1997 are cumulated for the year, we use the weighted ave rage of tax rates that prevailed before and after the tariff reform.
However, for a potential importer, the knowledge of a tariff reform in the near future could affect the timing of the imports. We do not have any means of correcting for this, and assume that the effective tax rate for 1997 is given by:
Tax 1997 = 0.75*(Year-end tax rate for 1996) + 0.25*(Year-end tax rate for 1997)
We then define DTax = Tax 1998 -Tax 1997 . Table 10 shows the estimation results. We note that the R-squared values are very low in these regressions; this suggests that we have differenced out much of the information in the data. In columns (1) and (2), with the change in Gap_Value as the dependent variable, the coefficient on DTax is significant at the 5 percent level, though marginally smaller than that obtained in our level regressions. The coefficient on Davg(Tax_o) is significant only at the 10 percent level, but is of the same sign as in the level regressions. We obtain similar results with the change in Gap_Qty as the dependent variable (see columns (3) and (4)).
Flexible functional form
We now allow the marginal effect of a tax increase on evasion to differ across different tax rates. Following, for example, Chamberlain (1997), we allow for the slope to differ across quartiles, with knots at tax rates of 29, 34, and 42 percent. The results, in Table 11 , suggest that there is little effect on evasion at relatively low tax rates.
However, as tax rates rise above the median level of 34 percent, the extent of evasion rises markedly. The marginal effect then tapers off at higher levels. As before, the effect of tax rate increases is larger when we control for average tax levels at the 4-digit level.
This pattern of non-linearity is consistent with the existence of a fixed cost in undertaking evasion activity. For example, if there is some fixity in the punishment for evasion, there may be a threshold tax level above which evasion becomes worthwhile.
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Alternatively, it is also consistent with a probability of detection that is invariant to the tax rate, so that the benefit of evasion increases more rapidly than the cost as tax rates increase.
Robustness to Alternative Specifications of Indirect exports
As noted in the data section of this paper, the Chinese customs-reported import figures are likely to include part of the indirect imports that are misclassified as direct imports. We have argued that the amount of such misclassified imports should not be correlated with the tax rate on the product since the same tax rate is applied to both direct and indirect imports. As a further precaution, we restricted our sample to those products where Hong Kong's direct exports to China are not trivial. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we take a new approach in measuring the effect of tax rates on tax evasion, by looking at the reporting gap in China's imports from Hong Kong, as a function of Chinese tax rates (tariff plus VAT rates). We find that this 'evasion gap' is highly correlated with tax rates: much more value is 'lost' for products with higher tax rates. The point estimates suggest that the Chinese average tax rate on imports is already on the wrong side of the Laffer curve: any increase in tax rate is likely to produce a reduction rather than an increase in tax revenue.
By comparing the evasion gap in quantities and in values, we conclude that there are widespread practices of under-reporting the unit values of imports, and mislabeling higher-taxed products as lower-taxed varieties.
As a broader contribution to the literature, we believe that our approach may also be applied to other countries. In addition to providing more information on the behavioral response of tax evasion to tax rates, the generalized multiple-country study could provide a more objective measure of the laxity of rule of law across countries -in contrast to the subjective perception based measures of corruption and rule of law now popular in empirical studies. We leave this, and other extensions, for future work. Notes: Entries reflect the median value of Gap_Value = log(Reported Exports) -log(Reported Imports), with number of observations in parentheses. Column (1) represents observations on 4-digit product lines where the tax rates are below the median; column (2) represents observations on 4-digit product lines where the tax rates are above the median. Note that the number of observations between rows (A) and (B) differ becaus e of possible multiple minima and maxima within each 4-digit class. 
